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ABSTRACT
Remorse is a profound and complicated emotion and it is one that is
evaluated in a surprising number of legal contexts. One particularly high-stakes
evaluation of remorse occurs in the context of discretionary parole, when a
parole board is deciding whether to release an inmate back to the community.
This Article explains the arguments justifying the evaluation of remorse in parole
hearings, evaluates how remorse is directly and indirectly incorporated into a
typical parole hearing, presents legal and psychological research about the
effect that the presence or absence of remorse may have on parole
commissioners’ judgment of inmates’ culpability and eligibility for release, and
articulates the challenges that arise in assessing remorse. Finally, this Article
makes recommendations for state parole boards that wish either to eliminate
remorse as a consideration in parole hearings or assess it more consistently.

* The views and opinions set forth herein are the personal view or opinions only of
the author; they do not necessarily reflect views or opinions of the law firm with which
she is associated. In memoriam Professor Joan Petersilia, who made tremendous
contributions to the field of criminology in her scholarship and as an advisor to
policymakers around the country and who deeply inspired her students.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS REMORSE?
When Timothy McVeigh was executed for his 1995 bombing of the
Oklahoma federal building, many headlines shared a common theme: No
remorse.1
Reporters described McVeigh as “stone-faced,”2 and his written
statement, a copy of a nineteenth century poem, conveyed defiance rather than
regret.3 Paul Howell, who lost his twenty-seven-year-old daughter Karan in
the bombing, expressed disappointment: “I was hoping we could see
something like ‘I’m sorry,’ but we didn’t get anything from the man.”4
In the eyes of the community, McVeigh committed two unforgivable
offenses: The first was on April 19, 1995, when he killed 168 people. The
second was June 12, 2001, when he missed his last opportunity to demonstrate
remorse for his actions.
Remorse is evaluated from the beginning to the end of the criminal
justice process. An offender’s remorse can persuade a prosecutor not to press
charges. A judge may weigh remorse in her decision whether to transfer a
juvenile to adult court,5 how much bond to set,6 or what kind of sentence to
impose.7 Capital jurors sometimes base their decision whether to vote for
death on whether the defendant appears sorrowful.8 Remorse may even affect

1. See, e.g., Sharon Cohen, McVeigh Dies with No Remorse, ARIZ. DAILY SUN
(June 11, 2001), http://azdailysun.com/mcveigh-dies-with-no-trace-of-remorse/article
_986d66f9-1f3b-5798-9c3c-ee627a4b2387.html [perma.cc/N5ES-M2N2]; Kevin
Fagan, McVeigh Shows No Remorse, SF GATE (June 11, 2001), http://www.sfgate.co
m/news/article/McVeigh-shows-no-remorse-2909973.php [perma.cc/5B7B-NTL4].
2. Fagan, supra note 1. For additional language representative of how reporters
described his remorselessness at execution, see Rick Bragg, The McVeigh Execution:
The Overview, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/12/us/
the-mcveigh-execution-the-overview-mcveigh-dies-for-oklahoma-city-blast.html
[perma.cc/YXP2-SGHH] (describing how McVeigh “died unrepentant, without
offering one word of regret” and how relatives of victims “searched his gaunt, holloweyed face in his final minutes for some kind of apology or answer . . . .”).
3. Rick Bragg, supra note 2.
4. Fagan, supra note 1.
5. See Martha Grace Duncan, So Young and So Untender: Remorseless
Children and the Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2002).
6. Rocksheng Zhong, Judging Remorse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
133, 152–53 (2015).
7. See, e.g., Ronald S. Everett & Barbara C. Nienstedt, Race, Remorse, and
Sentence Reduction: Is Saying You’re Sorry Enough?, 16 JUST. Q. 99, 99 (1999)
(discussing the federal sentence reduction for “acceptance of responsibility”); Zhong,
supra note 6, at 152.
8. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection
of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1558
(1998).
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the outcomes in civil matters such as fines for speeding violations,9 school
boards’ decisions whether to expel students,10 and bar admission committees’
leniency in approving applications by would-be lawyers whose “character and
fitness” investigations are unsatisfactory.11
Remorse pervades how we conceive of and deliver justice – and yet,
what is it?
Remorse derives from the Latin remord-ere, “to bite again.”12 The
etymology speaks to the experience of remorse; it is painful, it resurfaces, it
gnaws. Dictionary definitions provide helpful synonyms but are too succinct
to develop a thorough or nuanced understanding.13 Recognizing the need for
greater clarity, clinical psychologist Michael Proeve, along with legal scholar
Steven Tudor, analyzed philosophical literature on remorse to come up with a
descriptive breakdown of its principal characteristics.
According to Proeve and Tudor, a remorseful person displays most of
the following characteristics in some combination:
•

recognition that she has wronged and harmed another person

•

recognition that she was responsible for her action, which was
voluntary

•

a sense that her life has changed in some way as a consequence of
her action

•

various feelings of internal pricking, vexation or turmoil

9. See Martin Day & Michael Ross, The Value of Remorse: How Drivers’
Responses to Police Predict Fines for Speeding, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 224–
31 (2011) (surveying American and Canadian drivers ticketed for speeding and
finding that those who remembered expressing remorse received lower fines).
10. See, e.g., Suspension and Expulsion Procedures, WATERTOWN UNIFIED SCH.
DIST., http://www.watertown.k12.wi.us/cms_files/resources/53101%20Suspension%
20and%20Expulsion%20Procedures.pdf [perma.cc/UVC8-RXRX] (noting that “the
degree of responsibility and remorse the student feels regarding his/her offending
conduct” will be considered).
11. Mitchell Simon et al., Apologies and Fitness to Practice Law: A Practical
Framework for Evaluating Remorse in the Bar Admission Process, 2012 J. PROF.
LAW. 37, 37–40.
12. Remorse, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/remorses
[perma.cc/P3RV-RUTM] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
13. See, e.g., Remorse, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2009),
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/162286?rskey=oYs6za&result=1&isAdvanced=fal
se#eid [perma.cc/379P-JFMW] (defining remorse as “deep regret or guilt for doing
something morally wrong; the fact or state of feeling sorrow for committing a sin;
repentance, compunction”).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss2/18

4

Bronnimann: Remorse in Parole Hearings: An Elusive Concept with Concrete Cons

2020]

REMORSE IN PAROLE HEARINGS

•

a desire to atone or to make reparation, for example by expressing
remorse, apologizing, making restitution to the person harmed,
undergoing penance, and/or behaving differently in the future

•

a desire to be forgiven

•

some form or forms of having acted upon the desires to atone, to
make reparation, or to be forgiven.14

325

That definition has since been referenced or adopted by other researchers
in this area.15 However, even that list leaves questions relevant to parole
hearings unanswered, or open at least to multiple reasonable interpretations.
Among those that have been raised by scholars or commissioners are: Is
genuine remorse present immediately or does it develop over time?16 Is it
possible to be remorseful and still seek a reduction of punishment or does it
require humble submission to any judgment?17 What is the proper balance in
remorse between grief for one’s lost opportunities, acknowledgement of one’s
wrongdoing, and empathy for the victim?18 How is remorse different from
shame?19 What does genuine remorse look like?20
14. MICHAEL PROEVE & STEVEN TUDOR, REMORSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES 48 (2010).
15. See, e.g., Zhong, supra note 6, at 137.
16. See Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 131,
146–47 (2006).
17. PROEVE & TUDOR, supra note 14, at 133.
18. See id. at 36–49. While all three of these may be an aspect of remorse, the
over-indulgence of one can indicate the underdevelopment of another. Too much
focus on one’s lost opportunities, for instance, could indicate a failure to appreciate
victim impact. Detached empathy for the victim can indicate a failure to acknowledge
one’s wrongdoing. Jennifer Shaffer, the Executive Officer of the California Board of
Parole Hearings, shared an anecdote of an inmate convicted of rape who said in a
hearing that he wished he could “hug” his victim and make her feel better. Whatever
empathy this may have expressed for her pain, the parole commissioners were
disturbed by his failure to recognize how the victim would not want to be physically
embraced by her rapist. Jennifer Shaffer, Executive Officer, California Board of
Parole Hearings, Presentation to Class (Feb. 24, 2016).
19. Despite being “emotional neighbors” and sharing certain physical
manifestations, psychological studies examining the experience of emotions find that
shame is distinct from guilt emotions like remorse or regret. PROEVE & TUDOR, supra
note 14, at 67–70. Unlike guilt-feelings, shame inspires withdrawal and feelings of
rejection and inferiority. Id. Because these emotions inspire divergent behaviors, it
is important to distinguish between them. Id. Multiple studies have shown that while
guilt-proneness is positively correlated with empathy, shame-proneness is positively
correlated with anxiety, depression, and externalizing blame and negatively correlated
with empathy. Id.
20. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Remorse and Criminal Justice, 8 EMOTION REV. 14,
17 (2016) (“Thus far, there is no evidence that facial expression, body language, or
other physiological markers exist that can identify feelings of remorse.”).
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The concept of remorse blurs as we interrogate it. Despite its importance
throughout criminal justice proceedings, there is no legal consensus as to the
definition or indicia of remorse.21 The vagueness of the term invites legal
decision-makers to import their own conceptions of this complex and varied
emotion.
This Article, while drawing upon the scholarly research on remorse in
various stages of criminal justice, focuses primarily on its use in the
discretionary parole release decision. Discretionary parole is where a parole
board has an opportunity to determine whether to conditionally release an
individual from prison based on the board’s assessment of the individual’s
characteristics and preparedness. At one point in American history, nearly
three-quarters of all releases from prison occurred as a result of discretionary
parole, and every state and the federal government operated a parole system.22
The 1970s saw a shift in thinking. Many jurisdictions began to move
away from indeterminate sentences and parole release for “rehabilitated”
offenders. The rehabilitative ideal of punishment lost popularity in the wake
of studies showing that rehabilitative efforts appeared unsuccessful in
reducing recidivism.23 Critics also raised concerns that discretionary
decisions were biased along racial, class, or other impermissible lines and
argued that the psychological effects of not having an approximate release
date were detrimental to prisoners’ wellbeing.24 By 2000, sixteen states had
abolished discretionary parole for all offenders and another four had abolished
parole for certain violent offenders.25
Discretionary parole, however, never disappeared and is again gaining
attention as a potential tool in the decarceration agenda.26 States facing prison
overpopulation may see parole as a controlled release valve, as demonstrated
most recently by the passage of Proposition 57 in California in 2016. That
voter proposition, which was in part a response to a federal court order to
reduce the prison population, amended the state constitution to allow parole

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 14.
JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 58 (2003).
Id. at 63.
Id.
TIMOTHY A. HUGHES, DORIS JAMES WILSON & ALLEN J. BECK, TRENDS IN
STATE PAROLE 1990–2000, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. 1 (2001),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tsp00.pdf [perma.cc/ND7H-3ND4].
26. For a thorough explanation of why discretionary parole is a particularly
appealing option for states with overcrowded prisons, see Joan Petersilia & Jimmy
Threatt, Release from Prison, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORRECTIONS 1, 5 (Kent Kerley
ed., 2017), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118845387.wbeoc019/fu
ll [perma.cc/JD4B-7GCY] (“In trying to downsize prison populations, it is easier to
release eligible inmates through discretionary parole than it is to change sentencing
laws or the behavior of other actors in the criminal justice system such as police,
judges, or prosecutors. Additionally, as states decrease their prison populations, the
least serious inmates are targeted for early release.”).
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consideration for nonviolent offenders.27 Then-Governor Jerry Brown, who
spearheaded the campaign for the proposition, had also long voiced regret for
signing the determinate sentencing bill of 1977, which he believed reduced
the incentive for inmates to use their time in prison productively.28
With renewed interest in discretionary parole, the criteria used in the
parole decision should also come under review. The goal of such critical
evaluation is not to derail efforts to return to a more discretionary system;
rather, the goal is to continue a decades-long effort to professionalize the
practice of paroling by determining which criteria are most relevant to
parole’s purposes and what the best practices are for applying those criteria.
Part II of this Article explains the arguments justifying the use of remorse in
parole hearings, Part III examines the ways in which the evaluation of remorse
is incorporated into a typical parole hearing, Part IV discusses the effect that
the perception of remorse has on human judgment, and Part V addresses the
challenges that arise in assessing remorse and provides potential
recommendations for how to either eliminate it from consideration or evaluate
it more consistently.

II. WHY IS REMORSE RELEVANT TO PAROLE DECISIONS?
Besides popular fascination with the emotion, remorse persists in the
legal system in part because it aligns with almost all theories of punishment.
Indeed, countries as disparate in their approaches to criminal justice as
Sweden, the Netherlands, China, Japan, and the common law countries of
Canada, England, Australia, and the United States incorporate evaluations of
remorse into their legal systems.29 There are at least four reasons for why that
is so, as listed in Sections A-D below.

27. See John Myers, Gov. Brown to Seek November Ballot Initiative to Relax
Mandatory
Prison
Sentences,
L.A.
TIMES
(Jan.
27,
2016),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-jerry-brown-sentencing-reform-ballot20160127-story.html [perma.cc/897M-D6LL]. The Supreme Court upheld the order
in 2011, finding that California’s prison overcrowding violated the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493,
545 (2011).
28. See Jenifer Warren, Jerry Brown Calls Sentence Law a Failure, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/28/local/me-prisoners28
[perma.cc/LR45-A686] (quoting Governor Brown describing prisons as
“postgraduate schools of crime” because without the need to convince a parole board
to grant early release, there are no incentives to self-improve and learn marketable
skills).
29. Richard Weisman, Regulating the Expression of Remorse and the Building of
Moral Communities, in THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION: PHILOSOPHICAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 247, 248 (Catharine Abell & Joel Smith
eds., 2016).
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A. Remorse May Decrease Recidivism
By far the most pressing and relevant concern for a parole board is an
offender’s likelihood to recidivate. In every state where parole exists,
evaluating the risk posed by the offender’s release is essential; high or
unreasonable risk means certain denial.30
The perception that remorse correlates with decreased recidivism is
widespread among judges and parole officers.31 Moreover, a focus on
recidivism aligns with the utilitarian theory of punishment – that it is a means
to another end, commonly deterrence of future criminal conduct,
incapacitation, or rehabilitation.32 Because of the perception that an
offender’s remorse accomplishes some of the work needed to secure any of
those ends, remorse may make some portion of a sentence unnecessary.33 The
pain of remorse acts as a deterrent of future criminal behavior. By inducing
the acknowledgement of one’s wrongdoing and the motivation to make
amends, remorse makes it more likely that offenders will rehabilitate by
taking the steps necessary to address the destructive behaviors and attitudes
that led to their crime.34 Finally, less incapacitation is necessary if remorse
has successfully accomplished this work. As phrased succinctly by Judge
Posner in United States v. Beserra,
A person who is conscious of having done wrong, and who feels
genuine remorse for his wrong . . . is on the way to developing those
internal checks that would keep many people from committing crimes
even if the expected costs of criminal punishment were lower than they
are.35

However, empirical support for the correlation between expressed
remorse and reduced recidivism is equivocal. Until recently, there was little
or no evidence attempting to prove or to disprove the linkage. A 1988 study
examining offenders’ post-probation behavior showed no statistically
significant correlation between the expression of remorse and recidivism, and
30. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041 (2016) (instructing a board to release a
parole candidate unless “consideration of public safety requires a more lengthy period
of incarceration for this individual”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.141 (2015)
(instructing that panel may release a parole candidate only when the “parole panel
believes that the inmate is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding
citizen”).
31. RICHARD WEISMAN, SHOWING REMORSE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
EMOTION 6–7 (2014).
32. Id. at 6.
33. See, e.g., PROEVE & TUDOR, supra note 14, at 120 (discussing how utilitarian
principles operate upon “a general principle of parsimony, which requires that we try
to achieve the desired goal of a sentence by means of the ‘cheapest rate’ possible and
avoid imposing any punishment beyond that which is necessary to achieve that end.”)
34. Id.
35. United States v. Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1998).
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only a slight correlation between remorse and co-operation with probation
conditions.36 Likewise, a 2000 study examining expressed remorse, among
other factors, in psychiatric assessments of violent offenders in Canada
showed no statistically significant relationship between remorse and
recidivism.37
More recent research indicates that there is a modest but significant
correlation. Two studies in the early 2000s examining the recidivism of young
offenders who took part in restorative justice conferences38 found that
offenders who expressed remorse during their conferences were less likely to
reoffend than those who had not.39 A German study in 2008 assessed 1,243
young offenders in prisons through repeated interviews.40 The interviews
measured the frequency of guilt-feelings and shame-feelings by the offender
from week to week and then compared these measures to the recidivism of the
offenders once released.41 The study found frequent experiences of guilt
predicted decreased recidivism while frequent experiences of shame predicted
increased recidivism.42 More recently, a 2017 study found that remorse-prone
adolescent offenders, assessed through responses to a series of questions, had
fewer rearrests than those who were assessed to be remorse-resistant.43
Finally, lack of remorse is one of twenty items used to assess psychopathy, a
condition that is linked to increased recidivism.44
36. See PROEVE & TUDOR, supra note 14, at 90–92 (summarizing this study by
K.A. Romanowski and other studies relating to remorse and recidivism).
37. Id.
38. Restorative justice conferences are alternatives to traditional punishment.
INT’L INST. FOR RESTORATIVE PRACTICES, DEFINING RESTORATIVE,
https://www.iirp.edu/defining-restorative/restorative-conference
[perma.cc/4XFJBWGZ]. They bring together youth offenders, victims, their respective families, a
legal officer, and a facilitator to discuss the crime and its effects on participants. Id.
All participants then come to consensus agreements how the offender can repair the
harm. Id.
39. ALLISON MAXWELL & GABRIELLE MORRIS, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR
JUVENILES: CONFERENCING, MEDIATION, AND CIRCLES 267–84; Hennessey Hayes &
Kathleen Daly, Youth Justice Conferencing and Reoffending, 20 JUST. Q. 725, 749–
52 (2003).
40. Daniela Hosser et al., Guilt and Shame as Predictors of Recidivism: A
Longitudinal Study with Young Prisoners, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 138 (2008).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 149.
43. See Ryan Charles Meldrum et al., An Examination of the Criminological
Consequences and Correlates of Remorselessness During Adolescence, 16 YOUTH
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 279, 280 (2017).
44. See James F. Hemphill et al., Psychopathy and Recidivism: A Review, 3
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 139, 160 (1998). Moreover, remorse is
considered a particularly good indicator of psychopathy. See Daniel M. Bolt et al., A
Multi-Group Item Response Theory Analysis of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised,
16 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 155, 164–65 (2004); David J. Cooke & Christine Michie,
An Item Response Theory Analysis of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, 9
PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 3, 7 (1997).
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It is thus fair to say that there is at least some empirical support for the
notion that expression of remorse correlates with reduced recidivism. But that
relationship is far from well-established, and in the context of parole hearings,
probably rests on “gut feelings” more than anything else.45 Two explanations
may account for the lack of empirical data supporting the intuition that a
remorseful parolee is less likely to recidivate. The first is human error. Parole
commissioners may fail to distinguish genuine from feigned remorse and
release some remorseless offenders. As described in Part V, psychopaths may
actually be more likely to be released than non-psychopaths because of their
ability to charm and to persuade a parole board that they are rehabilitated.
Data that relies on expressions of remorse – which could happen if such data
relies on parolee statements of remorse or rationales from parole boards – may
therefore include a number of non-remorseful individuals. Such data is
subsequently less reliable in showing a connection between remorse and the
likelihood of reoffending.
Second, even the genuine experience of remorse is no guarantee that a
parolee will not reoffend. One parole commissioner shared that it was
common for him to watch inmates express sincere remorse for a past criminal
action and be released only to appear before the board a year later for a similar
crime.46 In his experience, most of these offenders struggled with addiction.47
Clean and sober in prison, they would face pressures on the outside such as
relationship dissolution and unemployment.48 Relapse into drugs and
economic stress would lead them to theft or robbery.49 Another parole
commissioner offered a similar perspective, after having observed an offender
in a parole hearing swear ardently to stay clean if released. She remarked,
“They always say that and they mean it too.”50 The pressures of the outside
and a tendency to return to unhealthy peer groups, she explained, frequently
derailed inmates’ commitment to sobriety.51 Thus, it may be true that remorse
correlates with a lower-chance of recidivism, but the data fails to properly
account for post-release conditions that drive a parolee to reoffend.

45. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse
and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 106 (2004) (“As of yet,
psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and criminology have not empirically linked
expressions of remorse and apology to a decreased need for specific deterrence of
particular offenders.”).
46. Telephone Interview with Frederic G. Reamer, Professor in the School of
Social Work, Rhode Island College and former State of Rhode Island Parole Board
Commissioner (Feb. 15, 2017).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Interview with Ellen Kirschbaum, Executive Director of the Arizona Board
of Executive Clemency, in Phoenix, Ariz. (Jan. 3, 2017).
51. Id.
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B. Remorse Makes Retribution Less Necessary
Retributive theory contends that “just deserts” is an end in itself. The
punishment of a crime is valuable on its own aside from how that punishment
rehabilitates offenders or deters other crimes. Offense-based retribution
focuses on providing a punishment that “fits the crime” and that reflects the
harm the crime caused independent of the offender’s personal traits.52 In other
words, people are sentenced for their crime, not their character. This is the
most common theoretical argument for not including remorse in sentencing,
and by extension, parole. Under this view, there is no logical place for the
expression of remorse in determining or reducing punishment.53 Some
scholars of this mindset justify their position by arguing that offenders should
not be given credit for feeling what one ought to feel; remorse is an
expectation, not a virtue.54
However, for offender-based retribution, remorse is relevant to the extent
that it makes an offender less culpable and therefore less deserving of
punishment.55 Remorse serves to distance the act from the offender’s true
character.56 Under offender-based retribution, punishment for the “worst of
the worst” should differ from punishment delivered to those with substantial
mitigating circumstances, including sincere remorse.

C. Remorse Serves the Aims of Restorative Justice
Encouraging and expecting remorse at a parole hearing may also be
justified as a way to acknowledge victims’ experiences and to encourage
offender reintegration, which are twin aims of the restorative justice
movement. Restorative justice is an approach to dealing with wrongdoing in
which “all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to
resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its
implications for the future.”57 An ideal restorative justice practice is one in
which victims are able to explain the impact of an offense on their lives and
offenders are able to acknowledge responsibility personally before the victims
and make symbolic or actual reparations.58 The result is restoring the
relationships and moral balance disrupted by the crime.59 Empirical studies
52. See, e.g., Zhong, supra note 6, at 139.
53. Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, Feeling Sorry? – Tell Someone Who
Cares: The Irrelevance of Remorse in Sentencing, 40 HOW. J. 364, 364–65 (2001).
54. Id.
55. See Zhong, supra note 6, at 139–40.
56. See, e.g., Richard M. Weisman, Being and Doing: The Judicial Use of
Remorse to Construct Character and Community, 2009 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 47, 50
(2009).
57. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 45, at 103 (citing John Braithwaite, who is
considered the top scholar on restorative justice).
58. See, e.g., Hayes & Daly, supra note 39, at 726–28.
59. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 45, at 103.
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of restorative justice programs suggest that they are at least as effective as
traditional prosecution methods for controlling some kinds of crimes and that
some victims feel participation helps them process their pain.60 Although
some restorative justice advocates call for this process to act as a substitute
for punishment, a more radical position, the aims of this movement are not
limited to that position.
Indeed, even scholars such as Professor Bierschbach and Judge
Stephanos Bibas – who reject the movement’s broad goals – agree that the
legal system should recognize the insights of restorative justice and make
greater use of apology and remorse.61 As they argue, apology and the
expression of remorse are integral to how humans navigate our daily lives,
serving as powerful means to “heal psychic wounds, teach lessons, and
reconcile damaged relationships.”62 This is part of the reason why people
intuitively seek remorse from offenders and feel satisfied at its exhibition.
Just as remorse and apology can improve interpersonal interactions, they can
improve criminal procedure as well. Indeed, when criminal procedure
foregoes remorse, the crime becomes abstract and the relational dimension of
wrongdoing is lost.63
Considering remorse during a parole hearing aligns with this model
proposed by Bibas and Bierschbach. A focus on remorse at a hearing provides
an opportunity for victims to encounter offenders in a controlled setting and
for offenders to reintegrate – but only after the offender has served a
substantial portion of the punishment.

D. Remorse is a Ritual with Important Communicative Value to
Society
Finally, an increasing number of sociologists and legal scholars have
suggested that the expression of remorse in a legal setting does more than just
attempt to repair the moral balance between victim and offender; it constitutes
a ritual through which social norms are shaped and affirmed.64 When an
offender expresses genuine remorse at a parole hearing, he or she commits to
the norms that define membership in a moral community, thereby
reintegrating.65
Offenders’ demonstration of remorse may be most
appropriate at a parole hearing because it indicates their knowledge of and
60. Id. at 116–17.
61. Id. at 147–48.
62. Id. at 87.
63. Id.
64. See generally NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY
AND RECONCILIATION (1991) (formulating apology as a moral ritual); WEISMAN,
supra note 29 (examining remorse in the context of moral communities); Donna L.
Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First
Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 829 (2003) (exploring the concept of apology
and the role it can play in the dispute resolution process).
65. WEISMAN, supra note 29, at 13.
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capacity to satisfy community norms at the very point in time when their
readiness to be imminently released to that community is under consideration.
Richard Weisman, Professor Emeritus at York University, contends that
this remorse ritual is a kind of “moral performance.”66 Regardless of how
remorse might naturally manifest in an individual, successful demonstration
of remorse must follow a certain script to be effective and accepted by the
moral community. Examining 178 Canadian cases in which the remorse of a
party was at issue, Weisman concluded that judges shape what this
performance is expected to look like through their dialogue with the parties.67
At least in the Canadian cases he analyzed, successful demonstration of
remorse must include acknowledgement of responsibility, gestures and signs
of internal suffering observable in demeanor, and evidence of personal
epiphany or transformation.68
Interestingly, while ideal, sincerity is not as important under this
justification for considering remorse. After all, the more the act of remorse is
ritualized, the easier it is to feign; offenders come to know what decisionmakers seek. However, because a moral performance has a symbolic and
communicative value to community independent of the individual’s true state
of mind, an individual’s ability and a willingness to perform the norm may be
more important than an individual’s subjective embrace of that norm. The
performance alone is both a reaffirmation of community values and
submission to those values. Weisman contends that this is why failure to
demonstrate remorse is seen as a different affront than the original offense.
He explains, “Outrage at the absence of remorse has far less to do with the
gravity of the offence than with the lack of deference that such a stance
communicates.”69

III. ASSESSMENT IN THE PAROLE PROCESS: WHO EVALUATES
REMORSE, WHEN, AND UNDER WHAT AUTHORITY?
Remorse hangs in the background of parole decisions as a likely, though
not always dispositive, criterion. At times, it is explicitly acknowledged as a
consideration via statutes and regulations governing parole board decisions.
However, remorse may also figure into decisions indirectly via inmate
demeanor and testimony, risk assessments, psychological evaluations,
program participation, or simply as a matter of commissioner discretion. This
Section details the various ways remorse can be considered in parole board
hearings. Examples of statutes and regulations in this Section are pulled from
states that release comparatively high numbers of inmates via discretionary
parole.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 38.
Id. at 23–45.
Id.
Id. at 44.
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A. Parole Statutes and Regulations
States vary in the specificity of parole criteria in statutes and regulations.
Some states use mandatory language, such as that a state shall release an
inmate unless they fail to meet certain enumerated criteria. California law,
for instance, instructs that a board
shall grant parole to an inmate unless it determines that the gravity of
the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of
current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration
of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for
this individual.70

Other states use precatory language, such as that a state may release an
inmate only when they meet certain criteria, and emphasize that release
remains a matter within the board’s expansive discretion.71 Texas makes clear
that, “Release to parole is a privilege, not an offender right, and the parole
decision maker is vested with complete discretion to grant, or to deny parole
release as defined by statutory law.”72 In the same vein, some states have
regulations listing particular factors tending to show suitability or
unsuitability while others emphasize that each decision is individual.73
The explanation for the varied level of generality at which these statutes
or regulations are written is twofold. On one hand, the language may reflect
genuinely different approaches to the criteria that should or should not be
considered in making a decision. Therefore, whether or not a State lists
remorse as a factor in the parole decision may reflect that State’s unique
penological values. On the other hand, the descriptiveness of the statutes and
regulations is often a response to legal or political challenges unrelated to any
specific criterion like remorse. Listing or not listing particular factors can be
part of an overarching strategy to expand or limit the flexibility of the parole
boards to make granting parole harder or easier.74

70. CAL PEN. CODE § 3041(b)(1) (2018).
71. 37 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.141 (West 2018).
72. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 145.3 (1) (2017).
73. Compare id., with CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2281(c) (2019).
74. Maximizing parole board discretion is often an intentional step to prevent
inmates from being able to challenge parole denials on due process grounds or new
regulations limiting release as ex post facto laws. For instance, in Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), the Supreme
Court recognized that inmates have a Fifth Amendment due process liberty interest in
the denial or delay of parole if the state parole system, through its statutory language,
creates an entitlement to parole. In essence, the more discretion that remains with the
parole board – the more a release remains an act of “legislative grace” rather than a
rubberstamp – the less likely a prisoner can challenge procedural aspects of their
denials for violating their constitutional rights.
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With that caveat in mind, most states do not explicitly mention remorse
as a factor to be considered;75 California and Pennsylvania are unusual for
doing so.76 California, in particular, extensively references remorse
throughout its regulations, which authorize consideration of “past and present
attitude toward the crime” and list “signs of remorse” as a factor tending to
show suitability.77
However, even in those states whose statutes do not explicitly reference
remorse, parole boards may still assign enormous weight to it.78 For instance,
although neither “remorse” nor a near proxy for it appear in the factors New
York parole boards should consider, New York’s case law frequently
mentions remorse as a factor that the board either appropriately considered or
inappropriately failed to consider.79
Moreover, state statutes and regulations often contain criteria that either
directly entail consideration of remorse or can be construed to do so. For
instance, if an inmate’s remorse is valued for its communicative value to
society and to pay respect to victims, a parole commissioner could well deem
that the release of a remorseless inmate would “deprecate the seriousness of
his crime.”80 Likewise, in a state where a parole board can only release an
75. See Laura Cohen, Freedom’s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller
v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1076 (2014).
76. California includes “signs of remorse” as a factor tending to show suitability
within its regulations. CAL. CODE REGS. § 2281(d). Pennsylvania includes “stated
remorse for the offense(s) committed” as one of its non-weighted factors in its parole
decisional instrument. Parole Decisional Instrument, PA. BD. OF PROB. AND PAROLE
(April 15, 2017), https://www.pbpp.pa.gov/Parole%20Supervision/Documents/PDI%
20361%2009-2014.pdf [perma.cc/DDD3-8NHC].
77. Interestingly, the factor “signs of remorse” is further described in the
regulation as follows: “The prisoner performed acts which tend to indicate the
presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage, seeking help for or
relieving suffering of the victim, or the prisoner has given indications that he
understands the nature and magnitude of the offense.” CAL. CODE REGS. § 2281(b),
(d) (2019). Providing guidance to what is meant by remorse is unusual.
78. See Cohen, supra note 75, at 1076, 1082.
79. E.g., Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 27–28 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2016) (“Based on the record before us, we conclude . . . that the Board acted with
an irrationality bordering on impropriety in denying petitioner parole. The Board
focused exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner’s conviction and the decedent’s
family’s victim impact statements . . . without giving genuine consideration to
petitioner’s remorse, institutional achievements, release plan, and her lack of any prior
violent criminal history.”); Molinar v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1214,
1215 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (finding that the parole board properly considered the
inmate’s continued failure to accept responsibility and the connection of that factor to
his rehabilitation in denying parole).
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.9 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
New York employs similar phrasing: The board may only release an inmate after
considering whether [his] release “will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime
as to undermine respect for law.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a)(ii)(c)(A) (McKinney
2017).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 18

336

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

inmate if “[he] will live and conduct himself as a respectable and law-abiding
person,”81 a parole board could determine that a remorseless person is less
easily deterred from reoffending and therefore less likely to obey the law. At
the least, they could decide such a person is not respectable.
Courts have generally refrained from second-guessing the parole boards’
application of the broad factors listed in states’ statutes and regulations. A
reviewing court often is only willing to overturn the decisions of a parole
board if commissioners have far-fetched interpretation of listed criteria82 or
have considered factors that are unlisted and deemed a detriment to rule-oflaw or fair procedure.83
While a boilerplate rationale for denial is generally insufficient,84 even
the due process protections in select states impose “only a minimal burden
upon parole boards to reveal the rationales for their decisions.”85 California
has perhaps one of the most demanding requirements of parole board
reasoning: determinations must be related to “current dangerousness” and be
supported by “some evidence.”86 However, even in California, a parole
commissioner who believes an inmate’s lack of remorse means that he is
unable or unwilling to critically evaluate what behaviors led to the crimes and
to avoid those behaviors in the future could conceivably connect
remorselessness to a conclusion that the inmate’s release would “pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to society.”87

81. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-42 (West 2015).
82. E.g., Hamilton v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1273 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014) (ridiculing a parole board’s determination that a “nearly 90-year-old,
terminally ill cancer patient with additional debilitating medical conditions that
required continuous medical care had ‘a propensity for extreme violence’ based solely
on the nature of the crime.”).
83. Id. (referencing other cases where the board considered unlisted and improper
criteria, such as commissioners’ own personal penal philosophy and views on the
historical treatment of murderers or a requirement that the inmate demonstrate how
his release would enhance society). Other factors are sometimes limited or forbidden
by statute. For instance, in Texas, parole boards are not allowed to consider “an
offender’s litigation activities” when determining candidacy for parole. 37 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 145.3 (2017). In Georgia, HIV status can be considered but cannot
be the only factor weighed. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-42.1 (2015).
84. Alexis Watts, Parole Release Reconsideration in States with Discretionary
Release, ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. LAW & CRIM. JUST. (Apr. 10, 2016),
https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/news-views/parole-release-reconsideration-statesdiscretionary-release#footnote12_zm1w6a4 [perma.cc/U5H5-HHT8].
85. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of
Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 493 (2008).
86. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 553 (Cal. 2008).
87. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2281(a) (2019).
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B. Inmate Testimony and Demeanor at Hearing
Because parole commissioners already have access to an inmate’s prison
file, which describes his crimes of conviction and institutional behavior,
parole board members receive little new information from interviews other
than their assessments of the offender’s character, remorse, and sincerity.88
Nonetheless, there is “near unanimity” that boards need to evaluate testimony
and demeanor at some point in the parole process.89 In 2015, the Robina
Institute disseminated a survey of states’ releasing authorities endorsed by the
Association of Paroling Authorities International. Of the forty states
responding to Robina Institute’s 2015 parole survey, thirty-eight considered
inmate demeanor,90 thirty-seven states considered inmate testimony, and
thirty-seven states considered inmate family testimony.91
Commissioners can assess an offender’s remorsefulness through any of
these means, and indeed, this often appears to be the point of having an inmate
appear in person. In California, for instance, hearings for inmates who have
been sentenced to life often focus on determining an inmate’s level of
“insight.”92 Though not listed in the parole regulations, inmates are aware of
it as an informal requirement. In the words of one California lifer released on
parole, “insight is the buzzword.”93
In his memoir about his time on the Rhode Island State Parole Board,
Dr. Frederic Reamer described the power of the interview as follows:
It was not unusual for me to have a tentative opinion in mind – based
on my review of the copious records – when the inmate entered the

88. Leanne ten Brinke et al., Crocodile Tears: Facial, Verbal and Body
Language Behaviors Associated with Genuine and Fabricated Remorse, 36 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 51, 51–55 (2012); R. Barry Ruback & Charles H. Hopper, Decision
Making by Parole Interviewers: The Effect of Case and Interview Factors, 10 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 203, 203–04 (1986).
89. Ebony L. Ruhland et al., The Continuing Leverage of Releasing Authorities:
Findings from a National Survey, ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM JUST. 26 (2016),
https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/final_national_par
ole_survey_2017.pdf [perma.cc/R2U5-3C2U].
90. Demeanor is generally thought to encompass “outward appearance or
behavior, such as facial expressions, tone of voice, gestures, and the hesitation or
readiness to answer questions.” Demeanor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019).
91. Ruhland et al., supra note 89, at 26. While important, it is worth nothing that
these factors were generally ranked lower in importance by parole commissioners than
factors like “severity of current offense,” “prior criminal history,” and “empirically
based risk assessments.” Id. at 27.
92. California case law recognizes and affirms that despite not appearing in
parole regulations, “insight” falls within their scope, being related to criteria like “past
and present attitude about the crime” and “remorse.” In re Shaputis, 265 P.3d 253, 270
(Cal. 2011).
93. Interview with paroled California inmate in Stanford, Cal. (Feb. 16, 2017).
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hearing room and then shift my position based on the in-person
interview. Sometimes my shift was in the inmate’s favor and
sometimes not. An inmate who had what appeared to be slim chances
of getting my vote for parole would overwhelm me with her insight
and sincerity, so much so that I changed my mind. In other cases I
found my in-person encounter with the inmate quite discouraging.94

Administrative reviews, another form of discretionary parole, provide
less of an opportunity to assess remorse. In these reviews, inmates are
evaluated on their paper files alone and paroled without an interview.95
Inmates are allowed to submit a written statement,96 which can still serve as a
vehicle for assessing an offender’s internal thoughts, but demeanor evidence
is eliminated entirely. Indeed, administrative reviews, mainly for offenders
convicted of less serious crimes, seem almost intentionally to relegate remorse
and other judgments of an offender’s character to the sidelines. For instance,
California’s regulations for implementing Proposition 57, which expands the
use of administrative reviews to determinately-sentenced nonviolent
offenders, differ substantially from the regulations in place for parole hearings
for long-term offenders. Whereas the regulations for parole hearings in place
for long-term offenders mention remorse as an explicit factor to consider, the
regulations for determinately sentenced nonviolent offenders focus
commissioners on objective factors like whether an inmate participated in
rehabilitative programming.97

C. Psychological Evaluations, Risk Assessments, and Institutional
Programming
Even in states where a board does not personally meet with an offender
or is more restricted in its decision-making, remorse is often assessed
indirectly by considering psychological evaluations, risk assessments
incorporating psychological evaluations, or in some cases, institutional
program participation.
In the Robina Institute Survey, all forty responding states reported using
a psychological report.98 And while the process for conducting psychological
evaluations varies by state, it commonly includes an interview with the inmate
by a trained psychologist. The psychologist includes in her report an opinion
on a matter relevant to the parole decision. In California, those reports are

94. FREDERIC G. REAMER, ON THE PAROLE BOARD: REFLECTIONS ON CRIME,
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND JUSTICE 62 (2017).
95. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2449.5 (2019).
96. Id.
97. Compare CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2281 (2019), with CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
15, § 2449.5 (2019).
98. Ruhland et al., supra note 89, at 26.
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based on a two to four-hour interview99 in which a trained psychologist
evaluates “factors impacting an inmate’s risk of violence, including but not
limited to factors of suitability and unsuitability [such as “signs of remorse”]
. . . .”100
Thirty-nine of the forty surveyed states reported using a risk assessment
instrument.101 Generally, risk assessment tools use a combination of static
and dynamic factors but vary in the factors selected and the weight given to
each factor. Remorse can appear in a number of ways. For instance, “lack of
remorse” is one of twenty items on the assessment used to measure
psychopathy, the PCL-R.102 Likewise, the HCR-20, used in California, has a
clinical item described as “insight” and a historical item of “psychopathy,” for
which lack of remorse is an indicator.103
Finally, all forty of the reporting jurisdictions reported using institutional
program participation.104 How this criterion is evaluated affects whether
remorse plays a role. For instance, some jurisdictions may heavily weigh
participation in classes that develop or manifest remorse, such as victim
offender dialogue, or substance abuse therapy if a crime was the result of
substance issues. Commissioners may ask inmates about these programs to
verify that the inmate took them seriously, testing them for basic knowledge
they should have acquired through the program or asking more in depth
questions about how lessons impacted them.
However, program participation can also be counted in a summary and
indiscriminate manner.105 Participation in a program that could foster
remorse, like victim-offender dialogues, may be treated the same as a program
to teach a skill like haircutting. Remorse does not play a large part in the
analysis when this is the case.106
99. Interview with Jasmine Tehrani, Senior Psychologist, California Board of
Parole Hearing’s Forensic Assessment Division, in Stanford, Cal. (Feb. 23, 2017).
100. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2240 (2019) (“Comprehensive Risk
Assessments”). This evaluation is related to requirement that the board evaluate the
“risk of danger” the inmate poses to society. § 2281(a).
101. Ruhland et al., supra note 89, at 26.
102. See, e.g., Cooke & Michie, supra note 44, at 7.
103. KEVIN S. DOUGLAS ET AL., RATING SHEET FOR VERSION 3 OF THE HCR-20 1
(2013).
104. Ruhland et al., supra note 89, at 26.
105. In Michigan, points are given for “adequate completion” of “recommended
or approved programs” and points are deducted for “inadequate” completion, but
programs aren’t broken down by category. MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., PAROLE
GUIDELINES POLICY DIRECTIVE 8 (2008), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/corre
ctions/06_05_100_330065_7.pdf [perma.cc/PVH3-NK58]. Texas only weighs
participation in educational or vocational programs in its risk assessment. RISK ITEM
FACTORS SCALE 1, http://www.paroletexas.com/articles/Risk_assesment_new.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J6JN-JN26].
106. An additional complication with equating program participation with
remorsefulness is that offerings in programs may vary across institutions in ways
outside the control of the offender.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 18

340

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

IV. HOW MUCH DOES REMORSE MATTER IN PAROLE HEARINGS?
In Riggins v. Nevada,107 the Supreme Court heard the case of David
Riggins, a man convicted of murder and sentenced to death. His defense was
insanity. The state administered him antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to
prevent him from being declared incompetent. Throughout the course of the
trial, Riggins was given high dosages of a medication known to produce sideeffects of sedation, unresponsiveness, and decreased emotional range.108
In concurring that this involuntary medication violated due process,
Justice Kennedy noted the effects of demeanor on punitive outcomes, writing,
As any trial attorney will attest, serious prejudice could result if
medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity to react and respond to
the proceedings and to demonstrate remorse or compassion . . . . In a
capital sentencing proceeding, assessments of character and remorse
may carry great weight and, perhaps, be determinative of whether the
offender lives or dies.109

In Riggins and other cases, the Court has accepted as fact and
normatively affirmed the influence of demeanor on a jury’s perception of a
witness or defendant.110 While the effect on parole release decisions
specifically is less studied, experimental data on the effects of remorse on
judgment generally as well as studies of its use in other legal decision-making
contexts indicates that remorse can profoundly affect release decisions.
First, evidence in controlled experimental research in psychology
suggests that remorse matters to how offenders’ culpability and future
dangerousness are perceived and what sentences are deemed appropriate.
Frequently, studies randomly assign participants to view two versions of a
scenario of wrongdoing, one in which the wrongdoer expresses remorse and
one in which the wrongdoer does not. For instance, a 2000 study used a

107. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
108. Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 16, Riggins
v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
109. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143–44 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The
primary object of the [Confrontation Clause of the Constitution] was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has
an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”); see also Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990) (“The combined effect of these elements of confrontation –
physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier
of fact – serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence
admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing
that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings.”).
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scenario where a spy was caught passing secret documents and another
scenario in which a student cheated on an exam.111 Remorse, or the lack
thereof, was indicated by a narrative paragraph provided to study participants
describing the transgressor’s actions and describing their exhibition of
remorse or lack thereof. In both, where the transgressor was described as
remorseful, participants perceived the offenders as more moral and less likely
to recidivate.112
Other studies have examined how remorse alters participants’
recommended punishments for the offenders. For instance, a 1976 study
presented a scenario where an intoxicated driver killed a pedestrian.113 The
experiment varied information about the defendant’s upbringing and his
expression of remorse. While the varied upbringing did not influence
sentencing recommendations, the presence of remorse led to sentencing
recommendations four to seven years shorter.114 Another study presenting a
similar scenario found more positive personal judgments for remorseful
offenders but did not see an effect on sentence recommendations.115
A small-scale meta-analysis by Proeve examined sixteen studies of a
similar experimental design supported two principles.116 First, where an
offender expressed remorse, participants had a more positive judgment about
the offender and recommended less severe punishment.117 Second, the effect
of remorse on both personal judgments and recommended punishment is
stronger for less serious offenses than for more serious offenses.118 For
instance, a 1992 study presented a rape scenario; while the expression of
remorse did lead to a less negative assessment of the defendant, it did not
induce participants to prescribe shorter sentences.119
Similar effects of defendant remorsefulness on real capital jury decisions
have been captured via the Capital Jury Project, an ongoing multi-state
research effort to systematically gather data from jurors who serve on death
penalty cases.120 After serving, randomly selected jurors are interviewed for
111. Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and
Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
291, 293–97 (2000).
112. Id.
113. See Michael G. Rumsey, Effects of Defendant Background and Remorse on
Sentencing Judgments, 6 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 64, 65 (1976).
114. Id. at 66–67.
115. Christy Taylor & Chris L. Kleinke, Effects of Severity of Accident, History of
Drunk Driving, Intent, and Remorse on Judgments of a Drunk Driver, 22 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1641, 1650 (1992).
116. See PROEVE & TUDOR, supra note 14, at 82–83.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Chris L. Kleinke, Robert Wallis & Kevin Stalder, Evaluation of a Rapist as
a Function of Expressed Intent and Remorse, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 529–33
(1992).
120. What is the CJP?, NE. UNIV., https://web.archive.org/web/20071115212142/
http://www.cjp.neu.edu/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
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three to four hours in order to understand the facts and attitudes that shape
their decisions.121 Multiple analyses of this data have revealed the importance
of remorse in those decisions.
A 1998 study analyzing the South Carolina arm of the project found that,
of the various factors jurors considered in their decision to impose the death
penalty, failing to express remorse was the third most aggravating factor,
following only prior history of violent crime and future dangerousness.122
When a defendant failed to express remorse, nearly forty percent of jurors
were at least slightly more likely to vote for the death penalty.123 A study in
the same year analyzing the California arm of the project found that almost
seventy percent of jurors who voted for the death penalty indicated the lack
of remorse as a reason for their vote, and two-thirds of jurors reported that
their panels discussed remorse in deliberation a “fair amount” or a “great
deal.”124
In federal sentencing, the importance of remorse is institutionalized in
the “acceptance of responsibility” sentence reduction, which can remove
years from a sentence.125 In many cases, “acceptance of responsibility”
equates to pleading guilty. However, the application notes within the
guidelines suggest that “appropriate considerations” may include “voluntary
payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt” and “post-offense
rehabilitative efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment).”126 Some courts
assert that the “acceptance of responsibility” adjustment is not “automatically
to be conferred upon every accused who pleads guilty” but rather “necessitates
candor and authentic remorse.”127
State judges also wield discretionary power through which they can
accord remorse weight as a mitigating factor at sentencing. Recent qualitative
research by psychiatrist Rocksheng Zhong suggests its influence in a
sentencing decision depends largely upon a judge’s personal views.128 Zhong
interviewed twenty-three Connecticut State Superior Court Criminal Docket
judges.129 He found judges’ views on the importance of remorse ran the full
121. Id.
122. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1561 (1998).
123. Id. at 1560–61. Within that group, twenty-one percent were “much more
likely” to vote for death. Id.
124. See Sundby, supra note 8, at 1560.
125. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016); see also, Michael O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance
of Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1997).
126. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 125, at § 3E1.1 n.1 (C), (G). Note
how these volitional acts tend to show both acknowledgement of the crime, a sense of
transformation, and attempts at atonement, elements of Proeve and Tudor’s definition,
see supra pp. 4–5.
127. United States v. Royer, 895 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1990).
128. Zhong, supra note 6, at 148.
129. Id. at 145.
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spectrum, with some describing it as “one of the most important things” in
sentencing, something they are “always looking for,” and a “very bedrock
type of thing.”130 However, others expressed views that they do not consider
remorse “even, as a matter of principle, terribly important” and that it is just
one factor among many to consider.131
The effect of remorse on parole decisions has not received the same
amount of scholarly attention. However, some principles from the above
research are applicable to the parole setting. The experiments showing
remorse has a significant effect on perceptions of an offender’s character and
their likelihood to recidivate is relevant to a hearing where a panel will decide
whether to release an offender to the community based on their “future
dangerousness.” Its mitigating influence on punishment may persuade
commissioners to feel less punishment is justified for a remorseful offender.
Moreover, as Zhong’s interviews suggest, judges hold a range of views as to
the relevance and effect of remorse, the same would likely be expected in
parole commissioners.
Various writings by parole commissioners have corroborated that
remorse is a threshold factor; the lack of remorse disqualifies a candidate but
the presence of remorse is far from a guarantee of release. In his memoir
about his time on the Rhode Island parole board, Dr. Frederick Reamer
described remorse as “essential” but not “a get out of jail free card.”132
Likewise, David Tidmarsh, a former psychiatric member of the parole board
in England and Wales, wrote that in his experience, boards were unlikely to
parole an offender who had not accepted responsibility for his crime of
conviction and “only slightly less reluctant” when an offender showed no
signs of remorse.133 Expressions of guilt are “important and probably
necessary,” at least where there are no claims of innocence.134

130. Id. at 148.
131. Id. Judges who did consider it also had differing beliefs on how to use it.
Some would be moved extend a more lenient sentence if remorse was expressed but
would not impose a harsher sentence if remorse was absent; others would extend a
harsher sentence in the absence of remorse. Id. at 149–50.
132. REAMER, supra note 94, at 45–46.
133. David Tidmarsh, Necessary but Not Sufficient: The Personal View of a
Psychiatric Member of a Parole Board, in REMORSE AND REPARATION 49, 54 (Murray
Cox ed., 1999).
134. Id. at 58. There is one famous and oft-cited case where remorse was absent,
but an offender was released, albeit only by the overturning of the parole board’s
denial. See, e.g., Joanne Martel, Remorse and the Production of Truth, 12
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 414, 418 (2010). This was a “mercy-killing” case in which a
father killed his severely disabled daughter just before she was going to go through
another painful surgery. Id. at 414. He maintained that his action was morally
justified. Id. at 418. Claims of innocence are another story, as some states have
regulations that prohibit the board from requiring an admission of guilt to any crime,
such that some inmates who maintain their innocence are granted parole without
expressing remorse. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2236 (201
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However, to date there has been little quantitative analysis of this
principle. An analysis of transcripts from 2007 to 2010 parole hearings for
inmates sentenced to life in California belongs to this limited body of
research.135 The analysis coded the transcripts for multiple variables to see
which had a significant effect on release decisions. The expression of remorse
did not have a significant effect, which as the authors of the study point out,
can be read either to mean that remorse was not heavily weighted by parole
commissioners or that it was evaluated by nonverbal cues, such as demeanor,
which could not be gleaned from transcripts.136 The analysis did show that
psychological evaluation had a significant impact.137 An inmate who received
“low risk” scores across the board was more than twice as likely to receive a
grant of parole than an inmate who received at least one score that was not
“low risk.”138 At least some of the assessments used by forensic psychologists
for the population in this study incorporated the evaluation of remorse as at
least one factor.139

V. JUDGING REMORSE
While most of the theoretical justifications for punishment are amenable
to considering remorse, the actual practice of evaluating remorse raises more
substantial concerns. The crux of the matter is: How does one begin to assess
objectively the “heart and mind” of another?140 By far, the greatest objection
to evaluating remorse at parole hearings is that it may be impossible to
examine accurately or fairly. Part A of this section discusses the difficulty of
agreeing to a common perception of remorse and Part B discusses the various
impermissible factors that can, and likely do, affect the assessment of remorse.

A. Accuracy: What Does Genuine Remorse Look Like?
The difficulty of assessing remorse begins with identifying it. There are
no objective, external markers of remorse, such as facial expressions or

135. Kathryne M. Young, Debbie A. Mukamal & Thomas Favre-Bulle, Predicting
Parole Grants: An Analysis of Suitability Hearings for California’s Lifer Inmates, 28
FED. SENT’G REP. 268, 268 (2016).
136. Id. at 275. Research has shown that nonverbal indicators of remorse are more
important than verbal indicators to the perception of remorse. See Zhong, supra note
6, at 168.
137. Young, Mukamal, & Favre-Bulle, supra note 135, at 274.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 269. The assessments used were the HCR-20, Clinician Generic Risk
assessment, Axis-V Global Assessment of Function, and the PCL-R. The HCR-20 and
PCL-R are discussed supra Part III.C.
140. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[T]he sentencer must attempt to know the heart and mind of the offender and judge
his character, his contrition or its absence, and his future dangerousness.”).
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gestures.141 Even psychologists who believe that there are universal ways of
expressing emotions across cultures142 cannot assign a “face” to remorse, as
they assert they can for more basic emotions such as happiness, sadness, fear,
or disgust.143
Given that fact, and with no additional guidance from statutes and
regulations, legal decision-makers unsurprisingly hold different and
sometimes contradictory ideas of what remorse looks like. In Zhong’s
interviews, for example, state judges revealed polar opposite interpretations
of the exact same indicators.144 Some judges felt silence reflected shyness or
mental illness; others felt it indicated remorselessness and detachment.145
Some felt eye contact was respectful; others found it disrespectful.146 Some
felt hanging one’s head indicated remorse; others felt it indicated
remorselessness.147 Finally, some judges believed genuine remorse would
have been expressed immediately after the crime, before conviction.148
Others believed people could genuinely change and develop remorse years
after the offense.149
Complicating the matter further is that even behavior that may be
considered an obvious tell of remorselessness like making jokes, laughing, or
impassivity, can have nuanced explanations having little to do with an
offender’s actual emotional state.150 A statement or behavior that appears
remorseless may be a defense mechanism, an act of denial, a cultural attitude,
a response to an intimidating environment, or an unrelated act of defiance
toward the legal system.151 This is why Proeve and Tudor suggest that
remorse can best be identified through consistent presence of indicia “over
time and across situations.”152 A psychologist making a diagnosis likewise
examines a cluster of behaviors before making a judgment; a single statement
141. See Bandes, supra note 20, at 17.
142. This is controversial within the field of affective psychology. Compare Paul
Ekman, An Argument for Basic Emotions, 6 COGNITION & EMOTION 169, 169 (1992)
(contending that emotions are a product of our evolution), with Raphael E. Jack et al.,
Facial Expressions of Emotion Are Not Culturally Universal, 109 PSYCHOL. &
COGNITIVE SCIS. 7241, 7241 (2012) (refuting common cultural expressions of
emotion). Others maintain a more neutral position, that some emotional expression is
innate and some is learned. See, e.g., Hilary Anger Elfenbein & Nalini Ambady, On
the Universality and Cultural Specificity of Emotional Recognition: A Meta-Analysis,
128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 203, 203 (2002).
143. See Ekman, supra note 142 at 191.
144. Zhong, supra note 6, at 158.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 159.
147. Id. at 158–59.
148. Id. at 159.
149. Id. at 160.
150. See Duncan, supra note 5, at 1469.
151. See, e.g., id. at 1474; Ward, supra note 16 at 151; Zhong, supra note 6, at
140–41 (referring to the work of Duncan and Ward).
152. PROEVE & TUDOR, supra note 14, at 49.
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or behavior is not dispositive of character.153 The idea that an offender is
afforded a full opportunity to demonstrate his remorse during an interview
that could be as short as fifteen minutes and occurs in an intimidating
environment supports the view that the evaluation of remorse “is more art than
science.”154
A commonly proposed solution to this problem of pinpointing remorse
is that one can assess credibility or truthfulness rather than the emotional
expression itself (i.e., “I can’t tell if he’s remorseful, but I can tell if he’s lying
about being remorseful.”). However, despite being ingrained in our legal
system, substantial empirical research casts doubt that ordinary people are
skilled in using demeanor to evaluate credibility.155
This has been demonstrated in the criminal justice setting, not just for
jurors but also for sophisticated repeat-players like parole commissioners. A
famous 1986 study by researchers Ruback and Hopper compared parole
commissioner judgments regarding an offender’s potential for post-release
success both before and after an in-person interview with the offender.156
Before the hearing, commissioners made a decision based on offenders’
files.157 After the hearing, they made a decision with the additional evidence
they gleaned from the parole interview, including the offender’s attitude and
degree of remorse.158 The results of the study indicated that after the in-person
interview, commissioners made less accurate predictions of post-release
success than they had based on the files alone.159 More shocking yet, a 2009
study of Canadian offenders showed that high psychopathy-offenders, as
identified via the PCL-R scores in their prison files, were 2.5 times more likely
to be granted conditional release than non-psychopathic offenders despite the
fact that the commissioners had access to these scores.160 One explanation for
this result, as well as the Ruback and Hopper study, is that decision-makers
153. Duncan, supra note 5, at 1492.
154. Melwed, supra note 85, at 505–06 (calling parole hearings “wrought with
subjectivity” and contending that unclear guidance for parole boards and lack of
judicial oversight exacerbate the problem).
155. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips:
The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157,
1159 (1993) (“The studies establish that typical subjects are unable to use the ‘manner
and conduct’ of a speaker to successfully detect deceptive information on any reliable
basis.”); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1991)
(“According to the empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make effective use of
demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness. On the contrary, there is some
evidence that the observation of demeanor diminishes rather than enhances the
accuracy of credibility.”).
156. Ruback & Hopper, supra note 88, at 203.
157. Id. at 203–07.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 211.
160. Stephen Porter, Leanne ten Brinke, & Kevin Wilson, Crime Profiles and
Conditional Release Performance of Psychopathic and Non-Psychopathic Sexual
Offenders, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 109, 116 (2009).
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were duped during the interview by the demeanor and verbal expressions of
the offender.
The research that does exist concerning the external manifestations of
deception indicates that common beliefs about a liar’s tells are misguided. For
instance, there is no empirical support that gaze aversion is an indicator of
deceit.161 In fact, because they are aware of its folkloric connection to truthtelling, liars may make greater eye contact.162
The cues that do indicate deceit are more subtle and more difficult to
assess in the moment. On the verbal side, liars generally speak slower,
provide less detail, include more verbal hesitations like “um” and “er,” and
use fewer first-person pronouns.163 In terms of demeanor, because lying
requires cognitive efforts, emotional leakage of one’s genuine emotions may
involuntarily occur. A recent study focused on this issue in the expression of
remorse specifically.164 The researchers asked participants to recall an event
for which they felt genuine remorse and “feign” remorse for an event for
which they did not feel remorse.165 They filmed the narratives and coded each
frame (1/30th of a second) for universal emotional expressions.166 The results
showed that deceivers engaged in more emotionally turbulent displays of
emotion, swinging from deliberate and false expressions to involuntary
leakage of genuine emotion with fewer neutral expressions.167
As promising as this research may be, it is currently of little value to
parole commissioners who must determine in the moment whether the person
before them presents an authentic or deceptive narrative of guilt and personal
transformation.

B. Fairness: Impermissible Factors Influencing the Perception of
Remorse
Beyond accuracy, isolating remorse from other non-culpable identities
and characteristics of an offender is an additional problem. A parole
commissioner viewing an offender sees not just contrition or the lack thereof;
the commissioner views a person with a race, a gender, a cultural background,
a socioeconomic class, and a mental status, all factors that may either be
apparent or become apparent during an interview and may affect the
commissioner’s perception of remorse.
While occasionally extant, explicit bias is not the primary concern. Even
thoughtful and well-intentioned people are prone to implicit bias and selective
161. ten Brinke et al., supra note 88, at 53.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 53–54.
166. Here, happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise, and contempt. Id. For
those who do believe there are universal innate emotional expressions, these are those
most frequently cited. Id.
167. Id. at 57–58.
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empathy, two sides of the same coin.168 Prejudicial associations across a
number of characteristics develop over time and may particularly work
injustice into cases where evidence is ambiguous.169

1. Race
Race is one of the most salient characteristics to examine for implicit
bias and selective empathy, and evidence suggests that evaluation of remorse
is not safe from racially influenced judgments. One well-studied prejudicial
association is between “blackness” and “criminality.”170 On the other hand,
empathy may flow more easily to those who are like us.171 Neural studies
have shown that people have stronger responses to pain of same-race
individuals than to the pain of people from different races.172 For those we
perceive as similar, we are also more prone to use our own feelings as a
template for how we imagine they must feel, whereas for those who are
dissimilar from us, we are more likely to resort to stereotypes to infer internal
states.173 A study found that minority defendants were less likely to receive
the federal sentence reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” even after
controlling for offender and offense characteristics.174 Similarly, a mock
experiment presenting capital penalty trials, with the race of the defendant
manipulated, showed participants were less willing to allow identical

168. Susan Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and the Consequences of
Misinterpretation, 3 J. L. RELIGION & ST. 170, 177–78 (2014).
169. For instance, white research participants evaluating job candidates for a
position based on ostensible interview transcripts “did not discriminate against black
relative to white candidates when the candidates’ qualifications were clearly strong or
weak, but they did discriminate when the appropriate decision was more ambiguous.”
John F. Davidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selective Decisions:
1989 and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315 (2000).
170. In a typical study exploring this association, research participants primed
with black faces more readily detect crime-relevant objects that those primed with
white faces. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual
Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 880 (2004).
171. Bandes, supra note 168, at 177. For an example of how empathic connection
can prejudicially advantage some offenders, see Michael Winerip et al., For Blacks
Facing Parole in New York State, Signs of a Broken System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/04/nyregion/new-york-prisons-inmatesparole-race.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/3PTJ-SPLV] (noting that a New York Times
analysis found fewer than one in six black or Hispanic men were released at his first
hearing compared with one in four white men and excerpting a portion of a transcript
where a white commissioner spent time during the parole hearing of a white, welleducated offender jovially reminiscing about their respective experiences of spending
summers in the Adirondacks).
172. Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., When Empathy Bites Back: Cautionary Tales from
Neuroscience for Capital Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 584 (2016).
173. Bandes, supra note 168, at 177–78.
174. Everett & Nienstedt, supra note 7, at 119.
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evidence to weigh as a mitigating factor when it was introduced for black
defendants than when it was introduced for white defendants.175
This effect may be exacerbated when a perceiver not only has implicit
bias against the offender but a heightened ability to empathize with the victim.
A review of capital jury decisions from 1976 to 1980 found black defendants
were four to five times more likely to be put to death for killing a white victim
than for killing a black victim.176 A recent study had self-identified white and
Asian participants rate pictures of black men for perceived stereotypical black
features.177 Unknown to the raters, the pictures were of black defendants who
had committed death-eligible offenses and had reached the end of their
penalty phase between 1979 and 1990.178 The study found that when the
murder victim had been white, the perceived stereotypicality of black features
was predictive: defendants with perceived stereotypically black-looking
features had been sentenced to death at over twice the rate than lighter skinned
African Americans.179

2. Culture
Identifications of remorse are also complicated by cultural differences,
broadly defined. Multiple scholars argue that, for instance, apology is more
frequent in Japanese culture.180 They suggest that in Japan, people are more
likely to apologize as part of the process to resolve a conflict, even when they
are not at fault.181 One study analyzing the final statements of those put to
death in the United States found that Southerners were more likely to include
apologies in their final statements than non-Southerners.182 However, they
were not more likely to express remorse, which was coded separately as a
combination of taking responsibility, asking for forgiveness, expressing
personal regret, and earnestness.183 The author concluded that belonging to a

175. The participants were also significantly more likely to sentence the black
defendant to death, especially in the black defendant/white victim condition. Mona
Lynch & Craig Haney, Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 573, 583 (2011).
176. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, An Analysis of Racial Disparities
in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 96 (1984)
(using data from eight states from 1976-1980).
177. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality
of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383,
385 (2006).
178. Id. at 384.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 819, 850–51 (2002).
181. Id.
182. Judy Eaton, Honor on Death Row: Apology, Remorse, and the Culture of
Honor in the U.S. South, Apr.–June 2014 SAGE OPEN 1, 1.
183. Id. at 4–5.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

29

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 18

350

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

“culture of honor” like the South made offenders more likely to apologize out
of a sense of politeness or reputational protection.184
On the other hand, membership in a particular ethnic culture or
subculture may make one less prone to admit guilt. Generally, belonging to a
minority ethnic or racial group may evoke certain emotional responses before
authorities representing the majority that seem inconsistent with remorse. For
instance, Marquette University Law School Professor Michael O’Hear argues
that the “acceptance of responsibility” federal sentencing reduction has been
consistently denied to those demonstrating “concealment, dissimulation, and
noncooperation” but that these behaviors are those which have been identified
in ethnographic studies to be common defensive strategies inculcated in
members of a subordinated class or ethnic group.185 Teenagers may similarly
put up a defensive front and try to appear “tough,” “alien,” and “mean” to be
accepted by peers, even if this does not express their genuine emotions.186
Youth culture can be at odds with or even categorically opposed to
expressions of remorse.187

3. Gender
Gender is another factor that can shape expectations about what remorse
looks like. Outward demonstration is crucial to a successful display of
remorse. As women are generally more expected and more likely to emote,
they may be more likely to be perceived as remorseful.188 Judges have
suggested that women may receive more lenient sentences because of their
expression of remorse.189 In the experimental context, mock jurors perceiving
guilt in a scenario of medical malpractice found female doctors expressing
remorse as less culpable than male doctors expressing remorse.190 On the flip
side, female doctors failing to express remorse were found more culpable than
male doctors failing to express remorse.191 This data suggests women may
have a greater advantage in successfully demonstrating remorse than men but
receive a greater penalty for not emoting.

184. Id. at 7–8.
185. O’Hear, supra note 125, at 1551–52.
186. Duncan, supra note 5, at 1500.
187. Id.
188. Desiree Adams Griffin, Exploring Remorse Behaviors: Verbal and
Nonverbal Indicators of Authentic, Exaggerated, and Feigned Remorse 16–18 (2011)
(unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Alabama), http://libcontent.lib.ua.edu/c
ontent/u0015/0000001/0000654/u0015_0000001_0000654.pdf [perma.cc/DS2Q-CR
KG].
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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4. Class
Even beyond engaging in certain defensive mannerisms that may be
inculcated in a subordinated class, a lower class individual may face
additional difficulties in demonstrating remorse to a parole board primarily
consisting of educated individuals.192 While a more educated offender may
be able to explain his emotional transformation more articulately or with
greater attention to story craft, a person who is illiterate or did not graduate
from middle school will likely have a harder time artfully expressing his
remorse, even though his actual experience of remorse is the same.
Furthermore, economic class can also determine whether an offender is able
to afford a good lawyer who can help the offender prepare for this
evaluation.193
The class background of the parole commissioners themselves may also
affect which narratives they find compelling. A story of remorse from an
educated professional, fallen from grace, may resonate more with a
commissioner than the more common tale of a former gang member and drug
dealer.
Additionally, psychological research has shown that individuals from
lower-class backgrounds are more likely to have extensive, interdependent
relationships and to experience life as something shaped extensively by forces
outside their control, whereas upper class individuals are more likely to have
an ethic of independence and a sense that life is shaped by personal
disposition.194 There is currently a lack of empirical evidence concerning the
relation between such experiences and a divergent assessment of remorse.
However, consider the following scenario:
An offender describes how he knew his friends were leading him down
a bad path but he continued to engage in increasingly violent and
ultimately lethal behavior in order to impress them and feel a sense of
control.195

192. At present, almost ninety percent of parole commissioners have achieved a
bachelor’s degree or higher and almost fifty percent hold advanced degrees. Ruhland
et al., supra note 89, at 20–21.
193. O’Hear, supra note 125, at 1549.
194. See e.g., Michael W. Kraus et al., Social Class, Sense of Control, and Social
Explanation, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 992, 1002 (2009) (finding that
lower class individuals are more likely to experience social and personal outcomes as
contextualized by their environment and to view the world as less controllable); see
also Michael W. Kraus et al., Social Class as Culture: The Convergence of Resources
and Rank in the Social Realm, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 246, 248
(2011).
195. Interview with Sal Lempert, Social Psychology PhD student at Stanford
University, in Stanford, Cal. (Apr. 8, 2017). This scenario is an elaboration of one
Lempert proposed.
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Someone from an upper class background may be more likely to see this
explanation as a prototypical neutralization technique, an attempt by the
offender to distance himself from the crime and a failure to accept
responsibility or develop insight. Someone from a lower class background,
however, may be more likely to view this explanation as a nuanced
demonstration of insight, in that it incorporates an understanding of the forces
within and outside the offender’s control. In this scenario, it is hard to say
that one perception is wrong and one is right; it is enough to say that an
offender’s release may depend on the commissioner’s background and not an
objective assessment of his “heart and mind.”

5. Mental Impairment
Zhong’s interviews with sentencing judges indicate that legal decisionmakers are often unfamiliar with psychiatric disorders and their
manifestations or the effects of medication on outward demeanor.196 Most
commonly, these judges felt mental illness neutralizes remorse; neither its
presence nor its absence affects their judgment.197 While this attitude may
prevent mental impairment from acting as an aggravating factor, it does not
help the truly remorseful offender who has a mental illness or impairment that
prevents him or her from understanding and performing the behaviors
commonly associated with remorse.
Judges in Zhong’s study also voiced widely divergent opinions about
how much value was added by psychiatrists’ input on remorse. Some were
inclined to be deferential to a psychiatric report; others felt it had no bearing,
that a professional degree was not required to assess such a basic thing, or that
the short duration of a psychiatric evaluation may make it an inadequate basis
for an assessment.198 In the parole context, the education of commissioners
on mental impairments or their deference to psychological evaluations is also
likely to vary.199

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In theory, evaluating remorse in criminal proceedings aligns with any
justification of punishment that takes the offender, and not just the offense,

196. Zhong, supra note 6, at 160; see also O’Hear, supra note 125, at 1549–50.
197. Zhong, supra note 6, at 160–61.
198. Id. at 161–63.
199. A 2010 report by the California Inspector General found that commissioners
have varying (but improving) levels of confidence in the psychological evaluations
and attorneys frequently have very little confidence in these evaluations. OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL REPORT, THE BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS:
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS AND MANDATORY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS (July
2010), https://www.oig.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Special-Report-on-theBoard-of-Parole-Hearings-Psychological-Evaluations-and-Mandatory-TrainingRequirements.pdf [perma.cc/WS5U-BY5J].
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into account. Moreover, as demonstrated by the pervasiveness of remorse in
popular cultures throughout the world, remorse plays an important role in
shaping norms. Remorse is a ritual by which a community reintegrates those
who affirm its values and condemns those who cannot; it is the perceived
demarcation between man and monster. Regardless of whether its potential
link to decreased recidivism is ever proven, it is unlikely that legal decisionmakers will cease to care about this profoundly human emotion.
Perhaps at no point is the evaluation of remorse more important than
when a parole board is deciding whether to release an inmate back to the
community. Parole commissioners have a difficult job; they must examine an
inmate’s background and character to decide if he or she is likely to obey the
law or will instead pose a danger to the public. Being human and judging
humans, some of their decisions will turn out to be wrong. The legal and
psychological research presented in this Article suggests that the evaluation
of remorse is especially prone to error.
At present, more can be done to standardize expectations of remorse or
mitigate bias in evaluations. Viewing the evidence presented in this Article,
a state parole board wishing to make improvements has two rational options:
eliminate remorse as a consideration in parole hearings or assess it better.
Recommendations for both possibilities are presented below.

A. Eliminate Remorse
An intentional and explicit strategy is necessary to reduce the weight that
remorse is given in parole hearings. Simply failing to mention remorse in a
list of statutory or regulatory factors will not remove it from consideration.
As discussed above, many of the criteria that seemingly do not incorporate
remorse, like “future dangerousness” or “the best interest of society,” can be
easily interpreted to do so.200 With such broad criteria, differences in the
personal philosophies of commissioners will continue to produce inconsistent
results. For that reason, an explicit admonition is necessary.
Best practices from the realm of jury instructions can inform this
admonition. A common assumption is that jury instructions to disregard
evidence don’t work and in fact may highlight and exacerbate the effect of
that evidence in jurors’ decision-making.201 However, recent scholarship
suggests that while imperfect, evidentiary instructions can work to reduce the
effect of inadmissible evidence in juror deliberation under certain
conditions.202 Those conditions include when juries are given a cogent
explanation of why they should disregard the evidence, when they are
admonished at the end of the trial proceedings, and when they must deliberate
before rendering a verdict.203
200. See supra Part IV.
201. David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65
STAN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2013).
202. Id. at 439.
203. Id.
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Extended to the parole context, parole commissioners could be guided
in their regulations to read, at the end of each hearing or review, an
admonition. The admonition should not be: “Don’t consider remorse,” as this
unexplained statement is likely to be ineffective and only prime a
commissioner to consider it. More promising would be a statement along the
lines of the following:
Remorse is not to be considered because of its proven inability to be
assessed accurately or fairly. Psychological research has revealed that
no behavior can be reliably assessed as ‘remorseful’ without
technological equipment. On the contrary, many behaviors that are
typically associated with remorse by legal decision-makers have been
proven to have no correlation to its authentic expression.

That admonition can be strengthened by requiring parole boards to
articulate their deliberations and reasons for denial on the record and by
allowing limited judicial or some higher-level administrative review of parole
decisions. If there is a clear indication204 that parole commissioners based
their decision entirely on the inmate’s appearance of inadequate remorse,
courts could overturn those denials.
Eliminating the in-person inmate interview would likely be one of the
most effective ways to reduce evaluation of remorse. Such a step is not
beyond the pale, considering that there is at least some evidence supporting
the conclusion that paper assessments lead to more accurate predictions of
inmate risk. By not having an inmate appear before the board, parole
commissioners’ confidence in their ability to assess the character of the inmate
would naturally falter, and they would be likely to base decisions on criteria
that can be more objectively assessed. As for the “inmate statements”
included in administrative reviews in California, the role of remorse could be
reduced by instructing inmates to limit their statements to making corrections
or to contesting conclusions in their file.
Regarding other factors considered by the board that may involve
remorse, it may be too dramatic a step to exclude any psychological reports.
After all, the risk of inaccurate assessment is reduced in these reports, at least
in systems where correctional psychologists are well-trained and given
adequate time to complete evaluations. However, a state committed to
eliminating remorse as a factor should investigate whether psychologists are
truly consistent in their assessment by researching reliability among raters on
items related to remorse.205 If there is a cause for concern, they should
eliminate, redesign, or reduce the weight given to psychological reports.
204. The standard of proof could vary based on how rigorously the court wanted
to police parole decision-making.
205. See Stephen J. Morse, Commentary: Reflections on Remorse, 42 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCH. L. 49, 54 (2014) (noting a recent field trial, with Swedish prisoners, in
which the overall reliability among raters was found to be moderately good but the
reliability of the “lack of remorse” item was relatively low at 0.51, with a large
confidence interval).
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Finally, risk assessments could be designed only to use dynamic factors
that don’t involve a character judgment – factors like age and the number of
institutional infractions. Institutional programming could still be considered
but only in the broad sense of whether an inmate participated in any programs,
without discussing with the inmate the nature and impact of those programs.

B. Assess Remorse Better
States may also seek to develop practices that allow the assessment of
remorse but aim to reduce inconsistent conceptualization and the effect of
implicit bias among commissioners.
The first step in addressing the lack of a common understanding of what
constitutes remorse would be to have parole boards articulate an agreed
definition in their guidelines. Ideally, the definition would be specific and
nuanced, along the lines of that provided by Proeve and Tudor.206 Parole
boards should then include in their new member trainings discussions of that
definition. New and returning commissioners should be encouraged to come
together and unpack the definition, sharing their own questions, thoughts, and
experiences in order to show the complexity of the inquiry.
Parole commissioners should also be alerted to misconceptions about
remorse and common pitfalls in its evaluation. For instance, they should be
informed that there is, as of yet, no firm link between an expression of remorse
and decreased recidivism. In their training, commissioners should also be
warned of how common it is for legal decision-makers to feel confident in
their assessments of remorse, even though research does not support this
confidence and instead has shown that legal decision-makers will at times
interpret identical behaviors to reach polar opposite conclusions about an
offender’s remorsefulness.207
Finally, parole commissioners should understand the concepts of
implicit bias and empathic divides, even if they are confident that their
judgment is unaffected by these psychological phenomena.
Most
commissioners, like most people, do not consider themselves biased and do
not consciously make judgments based on in-group/out-group identities.
However, implicit bias works in a much more subtle, unconscious, and
involuntary way than overt bias. By acknowledging the ubiquity of implicit
bias and focusing on strategies for mitigation, commissioners can be alerted
to the influence of factors like race, class, and gender on judgment, without
feeling their own character is under attack. Commissioners should be asked
to acknowledge group differences and to put effort into being aware of the
effects these differences might have on their thinking.208
206. See supra Part I.
207. Zhong, supra note 6, at 158.
208. HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 5
(2012). Currently, this recommendation does not entail use of the Implicit Association
Test (“IAT”), a measure of racial implicit bias that some researchers have claimed can
be a predictor of discriminatory behavior. Recent metanalyses have cast considerable
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Additionally, certain conditions of decision-making may increase
implicit bias – namely, distraction, pressure, ambiguity, low-cognitive
processing, and a lack of feedback. Parole boards can focus on creating
conditions that reduce bias by addressing those negative factors. To reduce
distraction and pressure, parole boards can allot sufficient time for each
hearing and responsibly manage commissioner workload. States can assist
their parole boards in this process by providing a budget for more
commissioner positions and administrative assistant positions. Ambiguity
and low-cognitive processing can be addressed by having a clear definition of
remorse as well as the other criteria articulated in guidelines. The board can
consider a protocol of having commissioners articulate their rationale for their
decision in writing before announcing it publicly.209 This would allow
commissioners to review their own reasoning before committing to it.
***
In sum, as political and scholarly attention returns to discretionary
parole, legal and psychological researchers should critically investigate the
criteria parole board members use to base their decisions. Doing so will help
parole commissioners feel they have adequate guidance to make difficult
decisions and, ideally, produce more consistent and accurate results. Parole
release decisions have momentous consequences; at stake are the inmate’s
liberty, the safety of the community, and at times, even a community’s values.
Legal scholars and psychological experts should work together to make this
process as fair and principled as possible, whether it includes evaluation of
inmate remorse or not.

doubt on whether IAT scores are reliable predictors of racial or ethnic discrimination.
See, e.g., Frederick L. Oswald et al., Using the IAT to Predict Ethnic and Racial
Discrimination: Small Effect Sizes of Unknown Societal Significance, 108 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 562, 569 (2015). Rather, for the moment, it would be
beneficial for parole boards simply to provide structured opportunities for
commissioners to have thoughtful discussion about implicit bias as to race, class,
gender, and other factors, as a part of their orientation or at separate trainings.
209. Id. (recommending this process for judges and jurors).
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